Follow-up:
I have tested dovecot's auth-policy mechanism, and I got it to work.
However, I see now that even this auth-policy mechanism doesn't give dovecot any way to *kill* an existing connection. It can allow dovecot to reject login attempts, and it can cause external activities to be performed based on the results of authentication, but terminating a connection is not something which can be accomplished via auth-policy.
I also read your other message where you referred to a stackexchange conversation about killing existing connections. That conversation confirms what I have observed in my own environment: that iptables offers no way to terminate an already established connection.
Also, "conntrack" is mentioned in that discussion, but I haven't been able to get conntrack to work on my debian-8 system.
Therefore, I think I will have to go forward with my idea of creating my own, personal version of dovecot which optionally allows the killing of connections after "N" failed login attempts (where "N" is configurable).
But in any case, the auth-policy mechanism allows me to deal with login issues more efficiently than monitoring log messages, and I will now switch some (all?) of my dovecot-based log-monitoring activites to auth-policy.
Thank you again for *all* your suggestions and help!
-- hippoman@gmail.com Take a hippopotamus to lunch today.
On Wed, May 25, 2022 at 9:00 PM Hippo Man hippoman@gmail.com wrote:
Thank you very much!
I didn't know about auth_policy, and I can see that an auth_policy server would be ideal for me.
I could transfer a lot of the logic to that server and dispense with most (and maybe even all) of my logfile monitoring.
I'm already using RBL with postfix, and it will probably indeed be helpful with dovecot, as well.
As for immediate triggering against impossible auth attempts, I guess I could come up with some sort of dictionary of these kinds of terms.
I very much appreciate all these ideas.
-- hippoman@gmail.com Take a hippopotamus to lunch today.
On Wed, May 25, 2022 at 6:03 PM Joseph Tam jtam.home@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, 24 May 2022, Hippo Man wrote:
Late to this party.
- Hacker makes numerous login attempts one after the other with various passwords, and without disconnecting in between attempts. I've seen 10 and more of these repeated attempts rapidly during a single imap or pop3 connection.
Maybe this settings helps?
auth_failure_delay = 5 secsI get lots of BFD, and although they have no chance of guessing a password this way, it produces an annoying amount of rubbish in my logs. This slow them down to either reduce the volume of attempts (and logs), but also gives you ample time to enact a countermeasure.
I will get the latest dovecot source code and modify it so that dovecot will disconnect after "N" failed imap or pop3 login attacks, where "N" is some sort of configuration variable (with a default of zero, meaning do not disconnect). I will then use this personal version of dovecot with "N" set to a fairly low value (probably 1!).
1, in my opinion, is really too low. This can lockout a legitimate user with a simple typo, or network hiccough.
It would be better to externalize this, rather than bake it into dovecot. Have you considered
https://doc.dovecot.org/configuration_manual/authentication/auth_policy/
Furthermore, I will continue to automatically monitor the logs and perform the same iptables DROP actions for the failed login attempts. The combination of these two actions will give me the behavior that I desire.
You can also preempt many BFD runs without resorting to one-strike-you're-out policy
1) Look up connecting host in RBL and do a prememptive block e.g. bl.websitewelcome.com, bl.blocklist.de, dnsbl.darklist.de are some examples of brute force DNSRBLs. You'll find many of attacking IPs are represented on one of these lists. 2) Triggerimmediate block against authentication attempts that can not possibly be real (e.g. "mysql", "testuser", "nagios",etc.)
Joseph Tam jtam.home@gmail.com